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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
LLOYD MAX RANQUIST, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040835-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing, with prejudice, charges of possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), an enhanced first degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (c), & 58-37-8(4)(a)(v) (West2004V 
and possession of drug paraphernalia, an enhanced class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5, 58-37-8(4)(a)(v), (c) (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the magistrate have a substantial basis to issue the search warrant, where 
five days earlier police found amphetamine residue in defendant's trash can, and 11 
days earlier defendant's daughter was arrested for possession of methamphetamine? 
JThe State cites the most recent version of the statute unless an earlier version 
applies. 
In reviewing the granting of a motion to suppress a search warrant, the appellate 
court does not review the magistrate's determination of probable cause de novo, but 
rather, simply determines "whether the magistrate had a '"substantial basis'" for 
determining that probable cause existed." State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104,114, 48 P.3d 872 
(citation omitted). That is, there must be "'a substantial basis to conclude that in the 
totality of circumstances, the affidavit adequately established'" . . . .""a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'"" State v. 
Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
This issue is preserved by the parties' pleadings, see R36-28 (motion to suppress), 
R65 (oral argument), R59-51 (written ruling).2 The prosecutor's reply to defendant's 
motion to suppress was inadvertently omitted from the pleadings file when the record was 
compiled and numbered for appeal; a copy is therefore attached to the State's stipulated 
motion to correct the record filed in this Court on 14 January 2005. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
2The record is numbered in reverse chronological order. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, an enhanced first 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), (c), & 58-37-
8(4)(a)(v), (c) (West 2004), and possession of drug paraphernalia, an enhanced class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-5, 58-37-8(4)(a)(v), (c) (West 
2004). R7-6. Defendant moved to suppress evidence found in a warrant-supported 
search of his residence. R36-29. Following oral argument on the matter, the trial court 
granted defendant's motion. R59-56 (a copy the trial court's written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is attached). See also R65:16-21 (transcript of ruling on motion to 
suppress). The trial court thereafter dismissed the felony information with prejudice. 
R62. The State timely appealed. R64. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant and his daughter, Jessica Vest, share a house located at 1390 West 1320 
North, Provo, Utah. R53. On 15 January 2004, Jessica was arrested by Orem City Police 
for possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. R53-52. Orem police 
forwarded information regarding Jessica's arrest to Officer Luthy of the Provo City Police 
Department on 21 January 2004. R53. That same day, Officer Luthy searched the trash 
can located in front of the Ranquist residence and stenciled with house number 1390. 
R52. That search yielded five small clear plastic baggies, one of which contained 
amphetamine residue, and five items of correspondence bearing the Ranquist surname. 
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Id. Officer Luthy also confirmed that defendant had a criminal history for possession of 
methamphetamine. R53. 
Search warrant secured. Based on this information, Officer Luthy obtained a 
search warrant for defendant's house five days later, on 26 January 2004. R52. 
Methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were found in the residence when the search 
warrant was executed on 3 February 2004. R53. 
Motion to suppress granted. Defendant moved to suppress methamphetamine 
and drug paraphernalia seized from his residence. R36-29. At oral argument, defense 
counsel asserted that neither Jessica's arrest for methamphetamine possession and drug 
paraphernalia nor defendant's criminal history of methamphetamine possession were 
properly included in the probable cause calculus. R65:4. According to defense counsel, 
the "sole indicia of probable [] cause that was available to the magistrate for consideration 
was the garbage can search." Id. However, defense counsel also deemed the five baggies 
containing amphetamine residue found in defendant's trash insufficient to establish 
current probable cause because police waited five days after their discovery to obtain the 
search warrant. R65:6-8. Finally, defense counsel argued that the good faith exception to 
the warrant requirement did not apply because the search warrant was "so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as would render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable." R65:8. 
The prosecutor argued that the instant search warrant was virtually 
indistinguishable from the search warrant upheld against a similar staleness challenge in 
4 
State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah App. 1997), which warrant was also based primarily 
on the fruits of a garbage can search yielding evidence of illegal drug possession. See 
R65:9-11. The prosecutor further argued that Jessica's arrest for methamphetamine 
possession 11 days prior to the garbage can search was by itself insufficient to establish 
probable cause, but that when considered together with the fruits of the garbage can 
search, probable cause to believe additional drug contraband would be found in the 
Ranquist house was established. R65:11 -12. 
The trial court ultimately agreed with defendant and suppressed the drug evidence. 
R59-56. First, the trial court found that there was not a "close connection between the 
'Ranquist' correspondence and the baggies found with the amphetamine residue, 
excepting that they were all found within the same trash can." R58. Second, the trial 
court found that any probable cause was stale because the search warrant was obtained 
five days after the baggies containing amphetamine residue were discovered in 
defendant's garbage. R58-57. Third, the trial court ruled that defendant's criminal 
history of meth possession and Jessica's recent arrest for possession of meth and 
paraphernalia were "irrelevant and [could not] be considered by the magistrate in making 
it's probable cause determination; and, in as much as the magistrate applied a 'totality of 
the circumstances' approach to [] review that information it was in error." R57. Finally, 
the trial court ruled that the good faith exception did not apply to the search warrant 
because the "issuing magistrate wholly abandoned it[]s judicial role and failed to perform 
it[]s neutral and detached function," and because "the warrant [was] based on an affidavit 
5 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable." Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred as a matter of law in suppressing drug evidence seized 
pursuant to a warrant-supported search of defendant's residence. Indeed, the magistrate 
had a substantial basis upon which to issue the search warrant based on information that 
defendant's daughter Jessica, with whom he shared his residence, had 11 days earlier 
been arrested for possession of meth and drug paraphernalia, that defendant himself had a 
criminal history of meth possession, and most importantly, that a search of the Ranquists' 
trash can just five days earlier had yielded five baggies containing amphetamine residue 
and correspondence bearing the Ranquist surname. 
Given the successful trash cover here, the trial court erred at the outset in failing to 
recognize that the instant search warrant was not meaningfully distinguishable from the 
search warrant upheld in State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 (Utah App. 1997). The warrant 
in that case was similarly based on the fruits of a trash cover, drug evidence and bills 
bearing the suspects' names. 
Moreover, even if the affidavit was somehow insufficient to support the search 
warrant, it was not so lacking in probable cause as to defeat the good faith exception to 
the warrant requirement. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE MAGISTRATE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS TO ISSUE THE 
SEARCH WARRANT WHERE FIVE DAYS EARLIER POLICE 
FOUND DRUG EVIDENCE IN DEFENDANT'S GARBAGE AND 11 
DAYS EARLIER DEFENDANT'S DAUGHTER WAS ARRESTED 
FOR POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
The magistrate issued the search warrant upon a finding of probable cause based 
on the affidavit of Officer Luthy. The affiant alleged the following facts: (1) defendant 
had a criminal history of meth possession; (2) his daughter, with whom he shared his 
residence, was arrested 11 days earlier for possession of meth and drug paraphernalia; and 
(3) an inspection of the Ranquists' trash can five days earlier yielded five items of 
correspondence bearing the Ranquist surname, and five baggies containing amphetamine 
residue. R55-51. The trial court suppressed the drug evidence seized pursuant to the 
search warrant. It ruled that the Ranquists5 criminal histories were irrelevant to the 
probable cause calculus, that there was an insufficient connection between the defendant 
and the amphetamine residue found in his trash can, and that the search of defendant's 
trash did not establish a present basis to believe that drugs were inside the Ranquist 
residence, because police waited five days after finding the amphetamine residue in 
defendant's trash before obtaining the search warrant. R59-56. 
Search warrant standard. "A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts 
towards warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for 
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) 
(internal quotes and citations omitted). Accordingly, the reviewing court—whether it be 
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a trial court or an appellate court—does not conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's 
determination. State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); accord State v. Weaver, 
817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991). Rather, the magistrate's decision is afforded "great 
deference." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. The reviewing court, therefore, should not set aside a 
search warrant simply because it might decide differently. Cf. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1987) (holding that because the appellate court does not weigh de novo 
the evidence at a bench trial, it will not set aside a trial court's finding simply because it 
might have reached a different result); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) 
(observing that reliance on the warrant was reasonable in light of the fact that the panel of 
the federal circuit court of appeals was divided as to whether probable cause existed). 
Like the magistrate, the reviewing court should "consider the affidavit... 'in its 
entirety and in a common sense fashion.'" State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, P. 3d ^ 7 
(quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993)); accord Weaver, 817 P.2d 
at 833. A warrant will be found invalid on review "only if the magistrate, given the 
totality of the circumstances, lacked a 'substantial basis' for determining that probable 
cause existed." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260 (citations omitted); accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 
238-39. 
The instant affidavit established a substantial basis for determining that probable 
cause existed here, or that there was a fair probability that evidence of drug use and 
possession would be found inside defendant's residence. In suppressing the drug 
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evidence seized pursuant to the warrant, the trial court failed to accord the magistrate's 
probable cause determination due deference. 
A. The instant search warrant is indistinguishable from the 
search warrant upheld in State v. Jackson. 
The trial court erred from the outset in failing to recognize that the instant search 
warrant is indistinguishable from the search warrant upheld in State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 
545 (Utah App. 1997). 
State v. Jackson is dispositive. In Jackson, police sought a search warrant for the 
home of defendant Smith and her companion, codefendant Jackson, based on their prior 
inspection of the couples' garbage cans and two prior incidents involving the couples5 
drug-related activity. 937 P.2d at 546. Specifically, approximately two months prior to 
the warrant being sought, the Jackson defendants reported that several unidentified men 
entered their house without permission and demanded drugs and money. Id. And, 
approximately one month prior to the warrant, Smith pled guilty to possession of 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. 937 P.2d at 547. The warrant-supported search of the 
defendants5 home yielded more drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id. 
On appeal, this Court upheld the warrant-supported search against the Jackson 
defendants5 claims that the warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 
547-548. The Jackson defendants first claimed "that the facts set forth in the affidavit 
fail[ed] to dispel the possibility that the contraband was placed in the garbage cans by 
strangers or neighbors while the cans sat at the curb.55 Id. at 547. The Court rejected this 
challenge, observing that the affidavit established that police found the drug evidence 
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"amongst" trash that included bills in both defendants' names: "This fact tends to suggest 
that the marijuana came from inside defendants' home, and was discarded by defendants, 
along with other refuse from the home, rather than by some unknown passer-by or 
neighbor." Id. 
The Court also rejected the Jackson defendants' claims that the affidavit failed to 
articulate present probable cause because it did not indicate when they had taken the 
garbage cans to the curb and therefore the drug evidence could have been in their garbage 
cans for weeks or months. Id. at 548. "Viewing [the affidavit] in a common sense 
fashion," this Court concluded that the affidavit "sufficiently dispel[ed] any substantial 
possibility of staleness in this regard." Id. "Although the affidavit [did] not state the 
specific day of the week when the city's garbage collectors were scheduled to dispose of 
the garbage at the residence, the magistrate could fairly infer, given the fact of weekly 
collection, that the contraband had not been lying around for longer than one week." Id. 
The Court stated that this "potential lapse of time was not significant enough to bar the 
magistrate from concluding there was probable cause to believe that drugs would be 
found inside defendants' home." Id. (citing Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260 ("The concern 
[with stale information] is whether so much time has passed that there is no longer 
probable cause to believe that the evidence is still at the targeted locale")). See also State 
v. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d 275, 278 (N.D. 1995) (holding it was "reasonable for the 
magistrate to conclude that the garbage bag had been placed outside Johnson's home 
recently enough, given the ordinary practice of weekly garbage pick-up"). 
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Significantly, this Court found the affidavit sufficient to establish probable cause 
without considering information about the drug-related break-in of the Jackson 
defendants' home and Smith's prior drug conviction, entered just one month earlier. 937 
P.2d at 548. Other courts have similarly upheld search warrants based solely on trash 
covers yielding contraband. See, e.g., Johnson, 531 N.W.2d at 278 ("We think it 
reasonable for the magistrate to have concluded, from the presence of marijuana seeds in 
Johnson's garbage bag, that more marijuana was probably located inside his house"); 
State v. Erickson, 496 N.W.2d 555, 559 (N.D. 1993) (holding that drug evidence and 
citation bearing Erickson's name found in Erickson's dumpster provided probable cause 
for issuance of a search warrant for his house); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 
398 (3rd Cir. 1981) (observing that three separate trash covers in late 1979 "formed the 
basis for a probable cause affidavit for a search warrant of defendant's home"); Magda v. 
Benson, 536 F.2d 111, 112 (6th Cir. 1971) (upholding search warrant for defendant's 
house based on trash cover yielding contraband). 
While not relying entirely on the fruits of a trash cover as did this Court in 
Jackson, see 937 P.2d at 548, some courts have upheld search warrant affidavits "based 
almost entirely on the evidence garnered from garbage," where, as here, the affidavit 
included the suspects' drug-related criminal history. See, e.g., State v. Duchene, 624 
N.W.2d 668, 673 (N.D. 2001) ("We conclude the items found in Duchene's garbage and 
Duchene's prior drug convictions were sufficient to establish probable cause to issue a 
search warrant");United States v. Sumpter, 669 F.2d 1215, 1221 (8th Cir. 1982) 
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(upholding affidavit setting forth drug evidence found in a trash cover, information from 
two anonymous informants, neighbors' complaints about short-term traffic, and 
defendant's prior drug conviction). See also United States v. Biondich, 652 F.2d 743, 745 
(8th Cir. 1981) (upholding affidavit reciting drug evidence found in defendant's garbage 
along with the details of defendant's two prior drug-related convictions). 
1. A mere five-day lapse between the discovery of drug 
evidence in defendant's garbage and the securing of a 
search warrant did not dispel probable cause. 
Here, as in Jackson, the drug evidence found in defendant's garbage can largely 
form the basis for the issuance of the search warrant. See R55-51. The only difference is 
that in Jackson, police secured and executed the search warrant on the same day they 
discovered drug evidence in the Jackson defendants' garbage. 937 P.2d at 546. Here, 
approximately five days elapsed between the discovery of five baggies containing 
amphetamine residue in defendant's garbage and the securing of the search warrant for 
defendant's residence. R55-51. Contrary to the trial court's reasoning, this five- day 
lapse is not a fatal difference between this case and Jackson. As this Court recognized in 
Jackson, garbage collection occurs on a weekly basis; thus, the drug evidence in 
defendant's garbage can was not likely "lying around for longer than one week" before 
the instant search occurred, and this "potential lapse of time was not significant enough" 
to dispel probable cause. 937 P.2d at 547. 
Neither was the lapse of another five days before the search warrant was secured 
so lengthy or significant as to dispel probable cause. Indeed, where, as here, "the suspect 
12 
was known by police to have been involved in drug violations[,]" "[a] mere passage of 
time does not necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the warrant." State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987) (rejecting staleness challenge where five days 
passed between the time the informant saw marijuana and the time the search warrant was 
issued). See State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 55, 57 (Utah App. 1989) (upholding search 
warrant issued two-months after informant last saw defendant smoking marijuana pipe, 
recognizing defendant's drug history reasonably suggested his drug activity was not 
"'isolated,'" but "'protracted and continuous,'"making "'the passage of time less 
significant'") (quoting United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972)). See 
also State v. Johnson, 531 N.W.2d at 278 (rejecting staleness challenge to warrant based 
on drug evidence found in Johnson's garbage six days before search warrant secured). 
This is because drug use can be a "habituating" and thus "continuing offense." Id. (citing 
State v. Mische, 448 N.W.2d 415, 419 (N.D. 1989)). Compare Zaner v. State, AAA So.2d 
508, 510 (Fla. App. 1994) (upholding search warrant issued 14-days after controlled buy, 
because such was "well within the thirty-day [rule]"), with State v. Josephson, 852 P.2d 
1387, 1392 (Idaho 1993) (holding that a 30-day lapse of time from garbage search to 
obtaining of warrant was sufficient to dispel probable cause). 
2. There was a sufficient nexus between the discovery of 
drug evidence and the correspondence bearing 
defendant's surname in the garbage to support the finding 
of probable cause. 
The trial court further erred in failing to recognize that the drug evidence found in 
defendant's garbage was as closely connected to defendant and his residence as the drug 
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evidence found in the Jackson defendants' garbage was to the Jackson defendants' and 
their residence. See R58 (ruling that affidavit failed to establish a "close connection" 
between the drug evidence and defendant). Just as in Jackson, police here found 
correspondence bearing defendant's surname and the drug evidence all within a garbage 
can indisputably belonging to defendant. R58, 53-51. No more was required. See 
Jackson, 937 P.2d at 547. See also Erickson, 496 N.W.2d at 559 (holding that citation 
and envelope bearing Erickson's name found with drug evidence in Erickson's dumpster 
"supplie[d] a nexus between Erickson and the contraband as well as between the home to 
be searched and the evidence sought"). 
In sum, applying Jackson to the instant warrant, the drug evidence found along 
with correspondence bearing defendant's surname in defendant's trash constituted present 
probable cause to believe that more drugs and paraphernalia would be found inside 
defendant's residence. The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to so recognize. 
B. Defendant's and Jessica's past possession of meth 
supports the finding of probable cause. 
Moreover, there was even more support for probable cause here than the Court 
relied upon in Jackson. Jessica's recent arrest for meth and drug paraphernalia possession 
and defendant's criminal history of meth possession were sufficient "to suggest that the 
[drug evidence] came from inside defendants' home, and was discarded by defendants, 
along with other refuse from the home, rather than by some unknown passer-by or 
neighbor." Jackson, 937 P.2d at 547. Jessica's and defendant's history of meth use and 
possession greatly reduced the likelihood that a passer-by may have taken advantage of 
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defendant's garbage can. See R58. In resisting this natural inference, the trial court failed 
to apply the well established Fourth Amendment principle that "the resolution of doubtful 
or marginal cases . . . should largely be determined by the preference for warrants/' or in 
favor of the neutral magistrate's determination of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-
237 n. 10 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)). 
Moreover, as noted above, Jessica's recent meth arrest and defendant's own 
criminal history of meth possession show the continuing, rather than isolated, nature of 
the crime at issue. They thus tend to refute defendant's claim of staleness. See, e.g., R34. 
Eleven days prior to finding amphetamine residue in their garbage, police had probable 
cause to arrest Jessica for possession of meth and drug paraphernalia; also, defendant 
himself had a criminal history of meth possession. Therefore, the meth histories of 
defendant and Jessica reasonably suggest that the evidence of drug activity uncovered in 
their trash was not evidence of an "'isolated'" incident as defendant claimed, but rather 
"'protracted and continuous'" activity, making "'the passage of time less significant.'" 
See Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57 (quoting Johnson, 461 F.2d at 287). 
Certainly, neither Jessica's prior meth arrest nor defendant's criminal history of 
meth possession could by themselves establish probable cause to search their residence 
for evidence of drug use and possession. State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 
1991). However, prior criminal involvement is a legitimate factor to be considered in 
combination with other information in determining probable cause. Id. See United States 
v. Brinegar, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (upholding probable cause for Brinegar's arrest for 
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unlawful transportation of liquor based in part on fact that officer had just five months 
earlier arrested Brinegar for the same offense); United States v. Jdnes, 362 U.S. 257, 271 
(1960) (recognizing that affiant's knowledge of Jones's narcotics history made 
informant's allegations "much less subject to scepticism than would be such a charge 
against one without such a history"). This is particularly true where, as here, the prior 
bad acts are of the same general nature as the one which the search warrant is seeking to 
uncover. See Wayne R. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure § 3.2(d), at 57-61 (4th ed. 2004) 
(analyzing Brinegar, Jones and progeny). See also State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1204 
& 1206 (Utah 1984) (upholding affidavit in support of search warrant based in part on 
suspects "extensive record" for same crime being investigated); State v. Covington, 904 
P.2d 209, 210 (Utah App. 1995) (upholding search warrant for suspect's basement 
apartment and "all persons present" where informant's reports of drug possession and 
trafficking were corroborated by officers' familiarity with suspect's history of 
involvement with narcotics); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 56 (Utah App. 1993) (recognizing 
affiant officer's knowledge of illegal drug possession suspect's "history of substance 
abuse and sales," corroborated confidential informant's observations of same); State v. 
Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (affirmatively noting that the affidavit 
recited facts "indicating defendant was involved in continuous and ongoing criminal 
activity" including "a substantial history of controlled substances violations by defendant 
involving her residence"); Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 55 (noting defendant's eight-year-old 
drug conviction corroborated informant's assertions of an on-going pattern of drug 
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usage); State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah App. 1991) (finding affidavit 
adequately established informant reliability based, in part, on officers' verification of 
defendant's prior, drug-related criminal record); United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106, 
1115 (10th Cir. 2004) (affiant's knowledge that suspect had an active arrest warrant for 
possession corroborated informant's tip that suspect's residence was a drug house); 
United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2002) (affiant's knowledge of "the target's 
prior criminal activity or record clearly is material to the probable cause determination" 
(quoting United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1993)); United States v. Foree, 43 
F.3d 1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1995) (magistrate reasonably concluded that suspect's criminal 
history corroborated confidential informant's veracity); Sumpter, 669 F.2d at 1222 ("[I]t 
is clear that an individuals' prior criminal activities and record have a bearing on the 
probable cause determination"). Contra State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 643-644 (Utah 
App. 1993) (holding that Brook's "criminal record, which indicated that from 1980 
through 1988 he had been convicted four times on controlled substances violations . . . 
does nothing to establish that he is currently dealing in controlled substances, particularly 
since his most recent arrest was [] at least two years prior to the events in the case at 
bar").3 
3Brooks's blanket holding "that criminal histories are not properly part of probable 
cause determinations because such determinations center only on the likelihood that 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place," P7g/z, 871 P.2d at 1033 (citing 
Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644), should be overruled. See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 
n.3 (Utah 1994) (observing that "a panel may overrule its own or another panel's decision 
where "the decision is clearly erroneous" (quotation omitted)). First, Brooks neither cites, 
reviews, nor acknowledges contrary federal and Utah case law, cited in the body of this 
brief, recognizing that criminal history may properly be included in the probable cause 
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Based on the above, although arguably rendered unnecessary under Jackson, 
defendant's and Jessica's meth histories were properly part of the magistrate's probable 
cause determination, because they reasonably reduced the likelihood that a passer-by 
discarded the drug evidence found in their garbage can, as well as being probative of the 
fact that the drug evidence in the Ranquists' trash reflected an ongoing lifestyle, and not 
merely an isolated incident, as defendant claimed. The trial court erred as a matter of law 
in concluding otherwise. 
C. The evidence should not have been suppressed because police 
reasonably relied on the search warrant. 
determination. This suggests that the Brooks panel "did not even realize that they were 
departing from well-established Utah precedent." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399. 
Second, in concluding that Brooks's criminal record was "not properly part of the 
[probable cause] determination," Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644, the Brooks panel provided no 
meaningful analysis or supporting authority. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399-400. 
Third, the Brooks per se rule does not work very well, given that the Court has not 
consistently thereafter refused to include corroborative criminal history in the probable 
cause calculus. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 400. See, e.g., Covington, 904 P.2d at 210 
(upholding affidavit and affirmatively observing that officers were familiar with suspects' 
history of involvement with controlled substances); Singleton, 854 P.2d at 1021 
(upholding affidavit and affirmatively observing that officer's verification efforts 
included speaking with other officers independently investigating suspects' international 
drug activities); Lee, 863 P.2d at 56 (recognizing affiant officer's knowledge of illegal 
drug possession suspect's "history of substance abuse and sales," corroborated 
confidential informant's observations of same). Even when the Court has refused to 
consider criminal history post-Brooks, it has not done so without allowing that criminal 
history may bear on the probable cause calculus in some circumstances. See Jackson, 937 
P.2d at 548 (noting Court "largely agreefs]" defendants' drug-related history, including 
Smith's prior conviction, was "stale and irrelevant" information); Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1033 
(recognizing prior convictions cannot be the sole basis for determining probable cause). 
Cf. State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993) (holding "fact that Potter was 
under investigation for drug distribution does not indicate that controlled substances will 
currently be found in his trailer" (citing Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644)). 
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The trial court further compounded its error here in refusing to apply the good faith 
exception to the warrant requirement. R57. 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921-22 & n.22 (1984), the United States 
Supreme Court held that absent unusual circumstances, evidence seized from a 
subsequently invalidated search warrant should be not be suppressed when the officers 
conducting the search reasonably relied on the warrant. Accord State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 
952, 958 (Utah App. 1993). The Supreme Court established this good faith exception 
because the remedial objectives of the exclusionary rule—to deter police 
misconduct—are not served where police reasonably rely on a warrant issued by a neutral 
and detached magistrate. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-919. Rather than always relying on an 
exception to the warrant requirement, officers are encouraged to seek the decision of a 
neutral magistrate on the matter. Given the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for 
warrants, "searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into 
reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a 
law endorsement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search." Id. at 922 
(citation and quotation omitted). 
Only when a defendant can establish that the officer's reliance on the warrant was 
not objectively reasonable will the good faith exception not apply. Leon identified four 
circumstances where the good faith exception does not apply because suppression 
remains a deterrent. First, it does not apply "if the magistrate or judge issuing a warrant 
was misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have 
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known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 923. Second, it 
does not apply if "the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role," becoming , 
in effect, a member of the search party team. Id. Third, it does not apply if the affidavit 
was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable." Id. (citation and quotation omitted). And fourth, the good faith 
exception does not apply if the warrant was "so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to 
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing 
officers cannot reasonably presume it be valid." Id. 
Here, the trial court found that the good faith exception could not be applied for 
the second and third circumstances outlined above or because the "issuing magistrate 
wholly abandoned it[]s judicial role and failed to perform it[]s neutral and detached 
function"; and because "the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." R57. 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, nothing in this record suggests that the magistrate 
participated in the search or otherwise abandoned his role as a neutral, judicial officer, or 
that search warrant was "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief 
in its existence entirely unreasonable." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. 
For the reasons set forth in parts A and B, supra, the instant search warrant is not 
meaningfully distinguished from the search warrant upheld in Jackson, which was 
similarly based primarily on the fruits of a prior garbage can search. 937 P.2d at 547-548. 
See also Sumpter, 669 F.2d at 1221 ("[I]t is well established that affidavits based almost 
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entirely on the evidence garnered from garbage may be sufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause"); State v. Jones, 653 N.W.2d 668, 676 (N.D. 2002) ("We have held 
probable cause to issue a search warrant existed in cases where probable cause was 
primarily established from drug residue in the garbage"). Although police here waited 
five days after the garbage search to secure the search warrant for defendant's residence, 
this wait was not so lengthy or significant as to be detrimental to the probable cause 
determination, particularly given that drug use and possession can be an addictive, 
continuing activity, see Johnson, 531 N.W.2d at 278 (upholding search warrant secured 
six days after suspect's trash searched), and that both Ranquists had a criminal history of 
meth possession, seey e.g., Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57 (noting defendant's eight-year-old 
drug conviction corroborated informant's assertions of an on-going pattern of drug 
usage). 
Given the wide acceptance of a search warrant based primarily on the fruits of 
garbage can searches, and, as here, the suspects' prior involvement in the crime sought to 
be uncovered by the search warrant, it cannot be said that the instant affidavit is "so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable," or that the magistrate necessarily abandoned his role as a neutral, judicial 
officer in relying upon it. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Therefore, even assuming the search 
warrant is ultimately deemed inadequate to establish present probable cause, "[u]nder 
these circumstances, the officers' reliance on the magistrate's determination of probable 
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cause was objectively reasonable, and application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is 
inappropriate." Id. at 926. 
Indeed, the remedial objectives of the exclusionary rule—to deter police 
misconduct—are simply not served where police reasonably rely on a warrant issued by a 
neutral magistrate as they did here. See id., at 918-919. In circumstances such as these, 
the officer should "[]not be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause 
determination or [her] judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. 
'[0]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the [officer] can do in seeking 
to comply with the law.5" Id. at 921 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40 
(Burger, C.J., concurring)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
trial court's order suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on <2l January 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
/MARIAN DECKER 
/ Assistant Attorney General 
22 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on ^ / January 2005, two copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT, & ESPLIN 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo,Utah 84603-0200 
Attorney for Appellee 
23 
Addendum 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
Randy Kennard #07907 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, UT 84606 
Telephone: (801) 851-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. 
LLOYD MAX RANQUIST, 
Defendant. 
: FINDINGS & ORDER ON 
: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
: SUPPRESS 
: Case No. 041400613 
: Judge Claudia Laycock 
The above entitled matter having come before the Court on the 3rd day of June, 2004, 
pursuant to a regularly scheduled hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Defendant 
being represented by attorney Michael D. Esplin; the State by Randy Kennard, Deputy Utah 
County Attorney. The Court having received into record the Affidavit in Support of Search 
Warrant and the Search Warrant at issue; having examined the contents thereof; having 
reviewed the briefs filed by the parties; having heard the arguments of counsel; and being fully 
advised in the premise, now makes and enters the following Findings of Facts, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order: 
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' M L E D V-2SW 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utan County, State of Utah 
.Deputy 
rttw-j.i^a 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 26,2004 Judge Davis, 4th District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, acting 
as magistrate issued the Search Warrant attached and annexed hereto. 
2. In support of the application for said warrant Officer Michael Luthy, Provo City Police 
Department, provided the magistrate with the sworn Affidavit in Support of a Search 
Warrant attached and annexed hereto. 
3. On February 3, 2004 the Search Warrant was executed by police resulting in certain 
items incriminating to the defendant being found on the premises of 1390 West 1320 
North, Provo, Utah. 
4. The information provided in paragraph number three (3) of the Affidavit in Support of a 
Search Warrant lacks indicia of probable cause in that the affidavit fails to establish a 
close connection between the "Ranquist" correspondence and the baggies found with the 
amphetamine residue, excepting that they were all found within the same trash can. 
5. The information provided in paragraph number three (3) of the Affidavit in Support of a 
Search Warrant was stale information in that five (5) days had passed jfrom the search of 
the trash can to the obtaining of the Search Warrant. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Pursuant to the holding and reasoning of the Court in State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 
(Utah App. 1997) the information contained in paragraphs numbers one (1), two (2) and 
three (3) of Officer Luthy's Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant is irrelevant and 
cannot be considered by the magistrate in making it's probable cause determination; and, 
in as much as the magistrate applied a "totality of the circumstances" approach to a 
review that information it was in error. 
2. Pursuant to the holding and reasoning of the Court in State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545 
(Utah App. 1997) the evidence obtained from the trash search as stated in paragraph no. 
three (3) of the Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant was stale information in that five 
(5) days had passed from the search of the trash can to the obtaining of the Search 
Warrant. 
3. The Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant did not contain probable cause to support 
the issuance of the Search Warrant. 
4. The good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) does not apply to 
this case because: (a) the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned it's judicial role and failed 
to perform it's neutral and detached function; and, (b) the warrant is based on an affidavit 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable. 
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ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all evidence seized pursuant 
to the Search Warrant is suppressed from being introduced at trial in this matter. 
By the Court this oiS day of Aru^u^ » 2004. 
S §M0^Mh Claudia Laycock 
: Court Judge 
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KAYBRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 EAST CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : SEARCH WARRANT 
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION : Criminal No. 
1390 West 1320 North 
PROVO, UT 84604 : 
Defendants 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Judge 
Endorsement 
It has been established by oath or affirmation made or submitted to me 
this J2^"*qay of January, 2004, that there is probable cause to believe 
the following: 
1, The property described below has been used, or is possessed 
for the purpose of being used to commit or conceal the 
commission of an offense, or evidence of illegal conduct. 
2. The property described below is most probably located at the 
premises also set forth below. 
The person or entity in possession of the property is a party to 
the alleged illegal conduct. 
S&C 
- ^ ^ 
<Z rs-P Q 
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to 
conduct a search of the residence located at 1390 West 1320 North, Provo, Utah. The 
residence is more particularly described as a single family dwelling, located on the 
north east corner of the intersection 1320 North and 1400 West. That the residence 
has light brown colored brick, with brown shingles on the roof. The numerals 1390 
are painted on the curb directly in front of the residence. 
You are also hereby directed to search the residence, together with the persons 
and vehicles of individuals present at the residence, for the following items; 
methamphetamine, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cash, packaging material, scales, 
and other items associated with the use, distribution, and storage of controlled 
substances and related paraphernalia. 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring the 
property forthwith before me at the above Court or to hold the same in your 
possession pending further order of this court. You are instructed to leave a receipt 
for the property with the person in whose possession the property is found or at the 
premises where the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with a written 
inventory of any property seized identifying the place where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE 
OF ISSUANCE. 
DATED this 26> day of January, 2004, tft&AM. 
KAYBRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION 
1390 West 1320 North 
PROVO, UT 84604 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
A SEARCH WARRANT 
Criminal No. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Comes now Officer Michael Luthy, having been duly sworn, who deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am a law enforcement officer for the state of Utah. That I am currently 
employed by the Provo Police Department, Community Oriented Policing 
Division. That I am a graduate of the Utah Police Academy (POST), and have 
received specialized training in law enforcement, including training specific 
to narcotics works. That this training includes methods of use, sale, 
distribution, cultivation, manufacturing of controlled substances, identification 
of controlled substances, as well as their appearance, odors and street use. 
That the affiant has investigated numerous cases involving the use, packaging, 
and paraphernalia associated with illegal narcotics. More specifically, 
violations of Criminal Code 58-37-8. 
2. That on January 15, 2004^your affiant received information from Orem 
Police that they arrested Jessica Vest. Jessica Vest lives at 1390 West 1320 
North in Provo Utah with her children. That on January 21,2004 your affiant 
received a copy of the arrest report from Orem Police in which Jessica Vest 
was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine. 
Jessica Vest is the daughter of Lloyd Ranquist. Loyd Ranquist also lives at 
1390 West 1320 North in Provo Utah. Lloyd Ranquist has a criminal history 
for possession of methamphetamine. With this information, it appears there 
is a drug house located at 1390 West 1320 North in Provo Utah. 
That your affiant conducted a search of the garbage abandoned at the curb 
located at 1390 West 1320 North,, with the number 1390 stenciled on the front 
of the garbage cans, for Provo City Sanitation to dispose of. The search 
conducted on January 21, 2004 at 0900 hours, revealed five, small clear 
plastic baggies with residue in them, and five items of correspondence with the 
name Ranquist on them. A field test of the residue on one of the baggies 
tested positive for amphetamine. 
4. That your affiant, based on Jessica Vest's arrest for drug paraphernalia and 
possession of methamphetamine on January 15, 2004, Lloyd Ranquist's 
criminal history for possession of methamphetamine, the evidence obtained 
from a search of the residence garbage on January 21, 2004 at 0900 hours, 
your affiant expects to findf: methamphetamine, paraphernalia, and other 
controlled substances, such as pipes, scales, buy-owe sheets, cash, and other 
items indicative of narcotic distribution and usage. 
5. The residence i s m ore p articularly described as a single family dwelling 
located on the north east corner of the intersection 1320 North and 1400 West. 
The residence has light brown colored brick, with brown shingles on the roof. 
The numerals 1390 are painted on the curb directly in front of the residence. 
Wherefore, your affiant requests that a knock and announce search warrant 
be issued for d aytime h ours by this court authorizing a search of the residence, 
together with the persons and vehicles of individuals present at the residence, for the 
following items; methamphetamine, paraphernalia, buy-owe sheets, cash, packaging 
material, scales, and other items associated with the use, distribution, and storage of 
controlled substances and related paraphernalia. 
Dated this ^ ^ day of January 2004 /p:^^^.M. 
AFF1ANT-MK 
Subscri^ed^nd sworn bef^€ me on ffie ^uP day of January, 2004, /O r< JO M 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the of [XXXJOAMIA/ , 2004 a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings & Order on Defendant's Motion to Suppress was mailed postage 
prepaid to: 
Michael D. Esplin 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
POBoxL 
Provo, Utah 84603 
NOTICE; UNLESS AN OBJECTION IS RECEIVED, THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED 
ORDER WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR THE COURT'S SIGNATURE AFTER 13 DAYS 
FROM THIS DATE 
fljJ'Jll'il 
urr iun w 
Utah County Attorney 
Kay Bryson, County Attorney 
Sherry Ragan, Criminal Division Chief 
E. Kent Sundberg, Civil Division Chief 
Jeff Robinson, Chief Investigator 
Criminal Division 
Mariane O'Bryant 
Curtis L. Larson 
Guy Probert 
David S. Sturgill 
Donna Kelly 
Jason Sant 
Jeffrey Buhman 
David H. T. Wayment] 
Timothy L. Taylor 
Nyal Bodily 
Randy Kennard 
Chad Grunander 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Phone (801) 851-8026 
Fax (801)851-8051 or (801)851-8099 
Monday, August 9, 2004 
Michael D. Esplin 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
PO Box L 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Lloyd Max Ranquist 
Case #04140613 
Dear Mike: 
As I mentioned to you in passing the other day, I prepared the enclosed Order on the 
suppression hearing. I reviewed by video the hearing before I prepared the Order. If you have 
any objections please let me know otherwise I will submit it on August 23rd if I do not hear from 
you. 
Sincerely 
Randy Kefin&rd 
Deputyv Utah County Attorney 
